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ABSTRACT 
Object Priming in the Fusiform Cortex: 
Exploring Effects of Task and Visual Similarity 
by 
Denise Y. Harvey 
Neural priming for same and different exemplars and viewpoints of objects was 
examined in two experiments using functional magnetic resonance imaging. In line with 
previous studies, viewpoint- and exemplar-specific priming was observed in the right 
fusiform gyrus (RFG). In contrast to some studies, viewpoint- but not exemplar-abstract 
priming was observed in the left fusiform gyrus (LFG). In the first experiment, neither 
task-demands nor visual similarity affected priming in the LFG. However, the RFG, 
including an area specialized for processing faces (the fusiform face area) was sensitive 
to the visual similarity of exemplar pairs. The second experiment explored this 
unpredicted result, but did not replicate the visual similarity effects. Results suggest that 
RFG and LFG are differentially sensitive to changes in viewpoint and are unaffected by 
task demands or visual similarity. 
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Object Priming in the Fusiform Cortex: Exploring Effects of Task and Visual Similarity 
One of the more interesting aspects of the visual system is that an individual can 
accurately identify a wide array of visual input forms despite the lack of uniform 
appearance. Although two cups may have entirely different physical properties, it is still 
possible to identify both as cups, while also distinguishing one particular cup from 
another. Similarly, the cup can be recognized even if viewed from different viewpoints, 
regardless of whether or not the viewpoint produces a similar input image as to that 
viewed typically. The visual system processes stimuli in such a way that one can 
recognize different exemplars and viewpoints of an object as belonging to the same, 
abstract category, but that they each belong to different, specific categories defined by 
their form. According to the recognition-by-components (RBC) model of object 
recognition, the visual system achieves both specific and abstract forms of object 
recognition through the use of a perceptual mechanism that derives the basic components, 
or geons, of objects, and arranges them to access object representations stored in 
memory. In other words, geons comprising different viewpoints and different exemplars 
of objects tend to overlap such that the abstract recognition of these varying visual input 
forms can be recovered; however, the specific recognition of an object relies on the direct 
match of geon configuration (Biederman, 1987; Hummel & Biederman, 1992). While 
this model provides an explanation of how the visual system can overcome problems of 
both specific and abstract recognition of objects, it remains unclear whether or not 
different areas of the brain mediate these two processes. 
The dissociable subsystems theory of object recognition posits that separable 
neural networks support specific-object recognition, the identification of an object based 
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on its specific form, and abstract-object recognition, the identification of two objects 
being the same despite dissimilar appearances. In accordance with this theory, the right 
hemisphere supports specific-object recognition for both different viewpoints and 
exemplars of objects, whereas the left hemisphere supports abstract-object recognition for 
both different viewpoints and exemplars of objects (Marsolek, 1999; Burgund & 
Marsolek, 2000). That is, the theory suggests that the same left hemispheric networks 
mediate abstract recognition for both different viewpoints and exemplars of an object. 
However, the theory is based on findings from divided visual field studies, and thus can 
only be certain of hemispheric asymmetries concerning the two types of object 
recognition, but cannot definitively claim that the same anatomical region mediates 
recognition for different viewpoints and exemplars. Indeed, neuroimaging studies have 
investigated the role of the fusiform cortex, an area consistently activated during object 
recognition, in the separable neural networks recruited for specific and abstract object 
recognition (Koutstaal et al., 2001; Simons, Koutstaal, Prince, Wagner, Schacter, 2003; 
Vuilleumier, Henson, Driver, & Dolan, 2002). While there is no dispute over the finding 
that the right fusiform gyrus (RFG) mediates specific visual form processing, the extent 
to which the left fusiform gyrus (LFG) mediates abstract visual form processing remains 
unclear. In particular, some neuroimaging studies suggest that the LFG stores different 
exemplars of an object in an abstract manner (Koutstaal et al., 2001; Simons et al., 2003), 
while another implicates this region in storing different viewpoints, but not exemplars, of 
an object in an abstract manner (Vuilleumier et al., 2002). In the present experiment, we 
aimed to replicate previous findings in regards to specific- and abstract-viewpoint 
recognition, and investigate factors that possibly affect specific- and abstract-exemplar 
recognition, such as task and exemplar pair visual similarity. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of both specific and abstract priming for different viewpoints 
and exemplars of objects. Specific-priming is evidenced when the priming 
magnitude for different-primed objects is less than that for same-primed objects 
(A). Abstract priming is evidenced when the priming magnitude for different-
and same-primed objects does not differ (B). 
Support for specific- and abstract- object recognition has been obtained in 
previous studies of object priming. Specific-object recognition is evidenced by greater 
same viewpoint or exemplar than different viewpoint or exemplar priming. Abstract-
object recognition is evidenced when test objects are processed equally well after having 
viewed an object of a different viewpoint or exemplar than during initial encoding. For 
the purposes of this paper, the four types of object priming that will be described are as 
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follows: viewpoint-specific priming, viewpoint-abstract priming, exemplar-specific 
priming, and exemplar-abstract priming (see Figure 1). 
Object-specific priming has been observed in divided visual field studies when 
objects of the same viewpoint or exemplar are presented to the right hemisphere. In 
contrast, object-abstract priming has been observed in divided visual field studies when 
different viewpoints of the same object or different exemplars of an object are presented 
to the left hemisphere. That is, the findings from such studies implicate the right 
hemisphere's involvement in viewpoint - and exemplar-specific recognition and the left 
hemisphere in viewpoint- and exemplar-abstract recognition. Because of these 
hemispheric asymmetries, it has been suggested that a specific visual-form (SVF) 
subsystem operates more effectively in the right hemisphere than the left, and an abstract 
visual-form (AVF) subsystem operates more effectively in the left hemisphere than the 
right (Marsolek, 1999; Burgund & Marsolek, 2000). Since behavioral experiments 
indicate distinctly lateralized sub-systems involved in object recognition, neuroimaging 
studies have investigated these hemispheric asymmetries in areas of the brain known to 
be involved in object recognition. 
One area of the brain consistently activated during object recognition is the lateral 
occipital complex (LOC; Malach et al., 1995; Grill-Spector, Kourtzi, & Kanwisher, 
2001). Findings from divided visual field studies suggest that regions of the LOC located 
in the right hemisphere would support specific-object recognition, whereas those in the 
left hemisphere would support abstract-object recognition. Within the LOC, the fusiform 
cortex, which includes the right and left fusiform gyri, demonstrates involvement in the 
aforementioned paths to object recognition. Indeed, functional magnetic resonance 
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imaging (fMRI) studies examining the neuroanatomical correlates of specific- and 
abstract-object recognition have garnered support for the findings from divided visual 
field studies, demonstrating that specific recognition for viewpoints (Vuilleumier et al., 
2002) and exemplars (Koutstaal et al., 2001; Simons et al., 2003; Vuilleumier et al., 
2002) recruited the right fusiform gyrus (RFG), and abstract recognition for viewpoints 
(Vuilleumier et al., 2002) and exemplars (Koutstaal et al., 2001; Simons et al., 2003) 
recruited the left fusiform gyrus (LFG). Surprisingly, however, failure to find exemplar-
abstract recognition in either the right or left fusiform gyrus has also been reported in the 
neuroimaging literature (Vuilleumier et al., 2002). It has been argued that these 
conflicting results are due to either methodological constraints of the experiment and/or 
an artifact of the stimuli employed. That is, some suggest this divergent finding may 
reflect a lack of exemplar pair name agreement (Simons et al., 2003) and/or that the pairs 
may have been too visually dissimilar (Simons et al., 2003; Vuilleumier et al., 2002). 
The RBC model of object recognition does posit that exemplars with a common name are 
more likely to share geons, and the extent to which different exemplars prime one another 
depends on the overlap between both study and test geons. Thus, according to this 
model, visually dissimilar exemplar pairs may lack common basic visual components 
necessary for priming (Biederman, 1987; Hummel & Biederman, 1992). However, it has 
also been shown that the subsystems recruited for the recognition of an object are largely 
dependent on the demands of the task at hand (Burgund & Marsolek, 1997; Marsolek & 
Hudson, 1999; Large, Aldcroft, & Villis, 2007; Joseph, Cerullo, Farley, Steinmetz, & 
Mier, 2006; Gauthier, Anderson, Tarr, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1997; Gauthier et al., 2002). 
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One can imagine that if asked to identify an eagle rather than bird, specific object 
recognition would be required for the former and abstract object recognition for the latter. 
Divided visual field studies have observed task-dependent effects of specific- and 
abstract-object recognition. In a letter-case priming study conducted by Burgund and 
Marsolek (1997), the researchers found that subjects instructed simply to perceptually 
identify previously viewed letter strings did not demonstrate a right hemisphere 
advantage for case-specific priming. However, altering the task demands so that subjects 
were required to identify the previously viewed letter strings in the same case as initial 
encoding resulted in case-specific priming in the right hemisphere, providing evidence 
that SVF subsystems operate more effectively in the right hemisphere, but that the 
efficiency of this subsystem is dependent on the task. Therefore, it is possible that the 
recruitment of SVF and AVF subsystems depends on the task performed while viewing 
objects. In the aforementioned neuroimaging experiments, the researchers who found 
exemplar-abstract recognition in the LFG (Koutstaal et al., 2001; Simons et al., 2003) 
utilized a different task from those who did not (Vuilleumier et al., 2002), which, in turn, 
could have affected the extent to which different exemplars of an object recruited an AVF 
subsystem mediated by the LFG. 
In fMRI experiments, priming is evidenced by a reduction in neuronal activity 
associated with processing a primed (repeated) compared to an unprimed (unrepeated) 
stimulus (Buckner et al., 1995,1998; Maccotta & Buckner, 2004; Schacter & Buckner, 
1998; but see Henson, Shallice, & Dolan, 2000; Turk-Browne, Yi, Leber, & Chun, 2007), 
and may be more sensitive to differences between stimulus types than estimates of 
overall activity (Grill-Spector & Malach, 2001). Therefore, in order to detect differential 
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activity between each prime type, the following experiments discussed here implemented 
an object-priming paradigm in which the activation for same, different viewpoint, or 
different exemplar primed objects is compared with that of activation for unprimed 
objects; however, as previously mentioned, these experiments utilized different tasks to 
assess these priming effects. 
Support for the role of SVF and AVF subsystems in the right and left 
hemispheres, respectively, comes from studies examining the neuroanatomical correlates 
of priming for different exemplars of objects through the use of a size-judgment task. In 
this task, subjects are presented with pictures of objects, and instructed to decide whether 
the referent of each object is larger or smaller than a 13-inch square box. In the 
experiments of interest, the researchers presented an actual 13-inch square box to the 
subjects in order to provide a concrete frame of reference for making this judgment. 
While in the scanner, subjects performed the same task during the initial encoding phase 
and subsequent test phase, in which the objects were presented several times during 
encoding. As previously mentioned, the researchers found reduced neuronal activity in 
the RFG for same primed objects over different exemplar and unprimed objects, 
signifying object-specific recognition. In the LFG, reduced neuronal activity was found 
for different exemplar priming relative to unprimed objects when compared with the 
RFG, indicating this area supports abstract-object recognition (Koutstaal et al., 2001; 
Simons et al., 2003). These results support the dissociable subsystems theory in that a 
SVF subsystem operated more effectively in the right hemisphere and an AVF subsystem 
operated more effectively in the left hemisphere. 
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In contrast, a study in which subjects performed an object-decision task provides 
conflicting evidence against an AVF subsystem in the left hemisphere when recognizing 
objects across different exemplars. In an object-decision task, subjects are presented with 
images of real objects and non-objects, or nonsense objects, and the task is to decide 
whether or not the object is real. In this study, the authors not only investigated object 
recognition across exemplars (Experiment 1), but they also examined the recognition of 
an object from varying viewpoints (Experiment 2). In the first experiment, the different 
exemplars of objects were presented later in the same trial; whereas, in the second 
experiment, different viewpoints of objects from the first experiment were presented. In 
regards to exemplar priming, the results revealed decreased neuronal activity in the RFG 
for repeated presentations of the same object as compared to different exemplars and 
unprimed objects, as predicted. Yet, unexpectedly, the results did not demonstrate 
exemplar-abstract recognition in either right or left fusiform gyri, thus concluding that the 
RFG and LFG mediate exemplar specific, but not abstract, priming (Vuilleumier et al., 
2002). While these results diverge from those previously obtained in regards to different 
exemplar priming (Marsolek, 1999; Koutstaal et al., 2001; Simons et al., 2003), findings 
from the second experiment investigating different viewpoint priming supports previous 
research (Burgund & Marsolek, 2000), in that the researchers found decreased neuronal 
activity for the repeated presentations of the same viewpoint in the RFG and for different 
viewpoints the LFG (Vuilleumier et al., 2002). Consequently, these findings complicate 
the interpretation of exemplar priming effects in the brain, and call to question the exact 
nature of SVF and AVF subsystems. 
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Some argue that failure to demonstrate exemplar-abstract recognition in the LFG 
might be due to differences in the names of the objects coupled as exemplar pairs, as 
Vuilleumier and colleagues (2002) did not report data on naming agreement. Moreover, 
it has also been suggested that the exemplar pairs used in Vuilleumier et al. (2002) may 
have been too visually dissimilar, which could also affect whether or not participants 
would consider the paired objects as the same object with a common name (Simons et al., 
2003). Indeed, prior studies that observed exemplar-abstract priming did ascertain a 
measure of name agreement for exemplar pairs (Koutstaal et al., 2001; Simons et al., 
2003), therefore it is possible that exemplar pair name agreement and/or visual similarity 
affected abstract priming; however, it is also counterintuitive to think that an AVF 
subsystem would rely on such bottom-up processes based on specific visual form in order 
to access the abstract representation of that object, unless of course, subjects did not 
consider the exemplar pairs as the same object. It could also be argued that the difference 
in findings for exemplar-abstract priming in the fusiform cortex is task-related, as 
previous research has found that this area is sensitive to task demands (Joseph et al., 
2006; Gauthier et al., 2002; Large et al., 2007) and the recruitment of SVF and AVF 
subsystems is task dependent (Burgund & Marsolek, 1997; Marsolek & Hudson, 1999). 
The study that did not demonstrate exemplar abstract priming used a object-decision task, 
in which participants could be employing "lower-level" visual processes based on 
familiarity (Vuilleumier et al., 2002); whereas, experiments that did demonstrate this 
effect used a size-judgment task, where participants have to use "deeper-level" 
processing to perform the task accurately (Koutstaal et al., 2001; Simons et al., 2003). In 
other words, when asked to determine the size of an object, one must recall the object's 
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referent in real-life, which, in turn, may activate further knowledge of the object, such as 
its name and other visual representations of objects with the same name. Thus, the size-
judgment task may prime other exemplars of the object by merely requiring that subjects 
think in depth about the properties of that object. In contrast, when asked to determine an 
object's existence in real-life, one can perform this task with great accuracy without 
having to retrieve prior knowledge of the object's referent in real-life. Therefore, it is 
possible that an AVF subsystem, operating more effectively in the left hemisphere, was 
not recruited for the object-decision task because performing this task does not call for 
processing abstract category membership information. This task would, however, 
involve the recruitment of a SVF subsystem in order to perceptually identify the visual 
form of the object as real or nonsensical. 
Experiment 1 
In this experiment, we investigated the effect of task-demands on fusiform cortex 
activation by having subjects perform either the object-decision task or the size-judgment 
task. The first aim of this study is to examine the patterns of activation for the different 
tasks when priming across exemplars. The present experiment will address the possible 
explanations for the divergent findings concerning exemplar abstract recognition 
(Koutstaal et al., 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2002; Simons et al., 2003) by obtaining a 
measure of name agreement and exemplar pair similarity. 
If priming for objects across different exemplars in the fusiform cortex is sensitive 
to task demands, it should follow that subjects performing the object-decision task 
demonstrate neural activity consistent with that of exemplar-specific, but not exemplar-
abstract, priming in the right and left fusiform gyri. Yet, subjects performing the size-
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judgment task should demonstrate neural activity consistent with that of exemplar-
specific priming in the RFG and exemplar-abstract priming in the LFG. On the other 
hand, if exemplar-abstract priming in the LFG is not sensitive to task-demands, and 
failure to demonstrate abstract recognition across different exemplars was due to the lack 
of name agreement or visual similarity, the preliminary data acquired will be able to 
parse apart these issues. Because this experiment obtained a measure of name agreement 
across exemplars, differences in activation cannot be attributed to this argument. 
However, if LFG mediation of exemplar-abstract recognition is susceptible to visual 
similarity, in that visually dissimilar objects do not prime one another, then it is expected 
that exemplar-abstract priming will be observed only for visually similar exemplar pairs, 
and not for those rated as visually dissimilar. 
This experiment also aims to replicate previously obtained viewpoint-priming 
effects, which suggest that viewpoint-specific priming recruits the RFG and viewpoint-
abstract priming recruits the LFG (Vuilleumier et al., 2002; Experiment 2). At present, 
viewpoint recognition, both specific and abstract, has not been extensively investigated 
from a neurological perspective, and is in need of further exploration. In a study 
investigating the neural substrates of mental rotation and object recognition, Gauthier and 
colleagues (2002) observe viewpoint-dependent, or specific, recognition in the RFG, but 
not viewpoint-independent, or abstract, recognition in the LFG. The findings from this 
study will provide further insight in regards to the hemispheric asymmetries associated 
with viewpoint priming effects. 
Additionally, the present experiment seeks to explore whether or not the 
recognition of objects recruits an area within the RFG known as the "fusiform face area" 
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(FFA) that, in some studies, shows selective activation for the recognition of faces over 
other classes of objects (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; McCarthy, Puce, Gore, 
& Allison, 1997; Kanwisher, Tong, & Nakayama, 1998; Yovel & Kanwisher, 2004; 
Loffler, Yourganov, Wilkinson, & Wilson, 2005). These experiments implicate a 
domain-specific function of the FFA in face processing. However, others have found 
FFA activation for other classes of objects, suggesting that this region is not necessarily a 
face-specific processing area (Haxby et al., 2001), but instead a generic object 
recognition system that is recruited when the perceptual demands of the object are similar 
to those of faces (Tarr & Gauthier, 2000; Gauthier et al., 1997; Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, 
Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999; Gauthier, Skudlarski, Core, & Anderson, 2000; Gauthier et al., 
2000). The domain-general hypothesis, or the idea that the FFA is process-specific and 
not stimulus-specific, is supported by a number of studies demonstrating that the 
representation of faces in the brain overlaps with that of objects (Haxby et al., 2001), and 
that the recruitment of this area depends on one's perceptual expertise with the object 
class. Based on these findings, some researchers suggest that the FFA supports 
subordinate level recognition automated by expertise, and faces are one such class of 
objects that everyone has expertise with recognizing. In other words, faces and, in some 
cases, objects demand holistic and configural processing, which are characteristics of 
subordinate level processing (Gauthier et al., 2000; Tarr & Gauthier, 2000; Gauthier et 
al., 1999). Therefore, we hypothesize that the FFA could also support specific-object 
recognition, as evidenced by specific priming for both different viewpoints and 
exemplars, if this area is process-specific and not face-specific. To test this idea, the 
present study incorporated an additional task—one designed to identify the FFA. 
13 
Accordingly, if the FFA supports viewpoint- and exemplar-specific priming, this priming 
should be observed in the area defined based on the FFA localizer task. 
Method 
Design. 
A 2 x 4 x 2 mixed factorial design was employed in which task (object-decision 
vs. size judgment) was a between-subjects variable and prime type (unprimed vs. same 
vs. different-viewpoint vs. different-exemplar) and visual similarity (similar vs. 
dissimilar) were the within subjects variables. For an example of each prime type, see 
Figure 2. 
B 
D 
Figure 2. Examples of the four prime types: unprimed (A), same (B), different 
viewpoint (C), and different exemplar (D). The left column represents what 
subjects see during the encoding phase, and the right column represents what 
subjects see during the test phase. 
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Subjects. 
Twenty volunteers (10 male; mean age 21) from Rice University and Baylor 
College of Medicine participated in the fMRI study. All subjects completed a screening 
questionnaire to ensure they had no history of neurological or psychiatric problems. 
Additionally, all subjects were right-handed, and had normal, or corrected-to-normal, 
vision. Informed consent was received from each participant in adherence to the 
guidelines and endorsement of the Institutional Review Board at Rice University. 
Subjects were paid for their participation. 
Materials. 
Stimuli were images of 80 objects selected from the Verfaillie and Boutsen (1995) 
corpus of depth-rotated images of familiar objects and from the corpus provided by 
Michael J. Tarr, Brown University (http://www.tarrlab.org/). These objects were named 
and rated in a normative behavioral study, in which 29 Rice University undergraduate 
students received course-credit in their psychology classes for their participation. Each 
subject was required to indicate their native language and the order in which they learned 
additional languages, if any. Informed consent was received from each participant, and 
upon completion of the experiment, subjects were given a debriefing form explaining the 
purpose of the experiment. 
Subjects received three different packets designed to evaluate exemplar pair name 
agreement and visual similarity as well as object viewpoint typicality. The naming 
packet was always given first, and the similarity and typicality rating packets were 
completed either second or third. In the naming packet, a blank space and the letters "B" 
for "Bigger" and "S" for "Smaller" appeared underneath each image, and subjects 
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indicated the name of the object and whether or not its referent in real-life is bigger or 
smaller than a 13-inch box. For this judgment, subjects could refer to a 13-inch box 
drawn on the chalkboard. For the similarity and typicality rating packets, rating scales 
appeared under each exemplar pair situated next to one another or a single object, and 
subjects were to rate the visually similarity of each pair or how typical it would be to see 
the object from that viewpoint, respectively. Ratings were from one, very dissimilar or 
atypical, to six, very similar or typical. For these ratings, subjects were instructed to 
distribute their responses across all six points rather than always respond with a one or a 
six. In both the naming and viewpoint typicality package, no two exemplar pairs 
appeared on the same page. 
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Figure 3. Example of a nonobject used for the purposes of the object-decision 
task. 
Based on the results from the behavioral experiment, 20 objects were later 
omitted from the fMRI portion of the experiment for obtaining less than 90 percent name 
agreement among the raters in the normative behavioral study. A median split of the 
objects based on the visual similarity ratings determined pairs considered as visually 
similar and dissimilar, which were later used to analyze the imaging data. Typicality 
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ratings were used for counterbalancing purposes only. Thus, a total of 60 real objects 
with 30 similar exemplar pairs and 30 dissimilar pairs were included in the fMRI 
experiment. Thirty nonobjects, selected from Burgund (2000), were included for the 
purpose of the object decision task (see Figure 3). For each of the real objects, two views 
and one different exemplar of the object were selected (Figure 4). The different views for 
each object varied in that the different-viewpoint image was rotated in depth by 45,60, 
90,75, or 105 degrees from the original presentation. The 60 objects were divided into 
four lists, with each list containing 15 objects. The lists were counterbalanced on all the 
measures rated in the normative data (exemplar similarity, viewpoint typicality, and size) 
so that each list obtained an equal number of similar exemplar pairs, typical viewpoints, 
and objects that were smaller or larger than a 13-inch box (see procedure below). The 
degree to which each object rotated from its original presentation was counterbalanced 
across lists as well. 
Exemplar 1 Exemplar 2 Rotated 45 degrees 
Exemplar 1 Exemplar 2 Rotated 90 degrees 
Figure 4. Example of an exemplar pair and a different viewpoint rotated 45 
degrees (A). Example of an exemplar pair and a different viewpoint rotated 90 
degrees (B). 
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For the FFA localizer task, images of 26 faces were selected from the corpus 
provided by Michael J. Tarr, Brown University (http://www.tarrlab.org/), and images of 
26 houses were selected from an online source (http://www.turbosquid.com/). The faces 
selected depicted a neutral mood, and comprised of different ethnicities representative of 
the population. All the houses were presented from the same viewpoint and did not 
contain extra visual distracters, such as grass, plants, or trees (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Example of a face (A) and house (B) that were used for the FFA 
localizer task. 
All images were presented centrally, in grayscale against a white background, and 
subtended approximately 2° x 2° of visual angle. Presentations and response-time 
measurement were controlled by the PsyScope software package (Cohen, MacWhinney, 
Flatt, & Provost, 1993). 
Procedure. 
The images were presented for 1000 ms during the encoding phase and 500 ms 
for all other trials at intervals 2.5 s, 5 s. or 7.5 s (average rate of 1 image per 5 s). A 
fixation cross (+) preceded each presentation and remained on the screen between 
stimulus trials. During the encoding phase, subjects were instructed to rate how 
frequently they encounter each object in their everyday life, using a four-point scale that 
corresponded to the four keys located on the response box. For the encoding trials, 
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subjects were asked to make their response after each object disappeared from the screen. 
In the object-decision task, subjects were instructed to decide whether the object 
presented was a real object or a nonobject. In the size-judgment task, subjects were first 
shown an actual 13-inch square box before entering the scanner, and once in the scanner, 
subjects determined whether the object presented was larger or smaller than the 13-inch 
square box. The stimulus presentations remained the same regardless of task; therefore, 
subjects performing the size-judgment task were asked to withhold their response when a 
nonobject appeared on the screen. That is, subjects performing this task were instructed 
not to press a key when presented with a nonobject. In the testing phase, subjects were 
asked to respond as quickly and accurately as possible by pushing a button with their left 
(or right) hand to indicate the "object" or "bigger" response and a button with their right 
(or left) hand to indicate the "nonobject" or "smaller" response. The response hand was 
counterbalanced across subjects. During the FFA localizer task, subjects were presented 
with either a face or a house and instructed to watch each image presented on the screen, 
and then press a button on each of the response boxes at the same time as soon as it 
disappears from the screen. 
Subjects completed two runs of the encoding phase, in which they saw each 
object twice. After completion of the encoding task, subjects were then given 
instructions on the testing task (either object-decision or size-judgment), and completed 
two runs of the assigned task. Each of the test items were split into two trials, in which 
the nonobjects and unprimed objects were presented intermixed with either the same, a 
different viewpoint, or different exemplar of the objects presented in the encoding run. 
Lastly, subjects completed two runs of the localizer task. In each run, no more than three 
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runs of the same prime type (unprimed vs. same vs. different-viewpoint vs. different-
exemplar) or stimulus type (object vs. nonobject; face vs. house) appeared consecutively. 
The encoding runs lasted approximately six minutes, the testing runs lasted 
approximately five minutes, and the localizer runs lasted approximately three minutes. 
Image Acquisition. 
fMRI data was collected at the Human Neuroimaging Laboratory at Baylor 
College of Medicine. At the start of each scanning run, a 10s fixation period occurred to 
allow for stability of magnetization. At the end of each scanning run, a 15s fixation 
period occurred to compensate for the delay in hemodynamic response. 
Structural and functional magnetic resonance images were acquired on a Siemens 
3T Allegra scanner (Erlangen, Germany). Anatomical images were acquired first, using 
a transverse MP-RAGE Tl-weighted sequence (Siemens) with a voxel size of .5 x .5 x 1 
mm (TR = 1200 ms; TE = 2.93 ms; flip angle = 12°). Functional images were acquired 
using an echo-planar sequence (TR = 2500 ms; TE = 40 ms; flip angle = 90°). During 
each functional run, 108 (encoding phase), 131 (testing phase), and 62 (localizer phases) 
sets of 26 contiguous 4-mm thick axial images were acquired parallel to the anterior-
posterior commissure plane. 
Image Analysis. 
Data from each subject were preprocessed to remove noise and artifacts, including 
correction for movement within and across runs using a rigid-body rotation and 
translation algorithm (Friston, Jezzard, & Turner, 1994; Snyder, 1996). Image slices 
were temporally realigned (using sine interpolation) to the midpoint of the first slice, 
accounting for differences in the acquisition time for each individual slice. Data were 
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then resampled into 2-mm isotropic voxels and warped into a standardized atlas space 
(Talairach & Tournoux, 1988). 
Preprocessed data were analyzed using the General Linear Model (GLM; Friston 
et al., 1994; Josephs, Turner, & Friston, 1997; Miezen, Maccotta, Ollinger, Peterson, & 
Buckner, 2000; Zarahn, Aguirre, & D'Esposito, 1997) in the FIDL analysis package 
(http://www.nil.wustl.edu/~fidl). No shape was assumed for the priming effects. Instead, 
neural signals throughout the eight conditions of interest [prime type (4); similarity (2)] 
to assess priming effects and for the two conditions of interest [faces vs. houses] to 
localize the FFA were modeled in the GLM across the seven time points (i.e., image 
acquisitions), beginning immediately after the onset of stimuli. Additionally, a factor 
was coded in order to account for the within-run linear trend (linear drift and a constant 
term). All effects were modeled concurrently in the GLM for each participant. 
Regions exhibiting object priming effects and those localizing the FFA were 
defined based on two separate voxel-wise analyses. In order to identify regions 
demonstrating object-priming effects, a two-way, repeated measures ANOVA was 
performed, in which time (at seven time points) and prime type (same primed vs. 
unprimed) were the independent variables. The F statistical image produced by this 
analysis was smoothed by a 2-mm radius hard sphere kernel. Regions of interest 
corresponding to the FFA localizer task were defined based on a two-way, repeated-
measures ANOVA, in which time (at the seven time points) and stimulus type (face vs. 
house) were the independent variables. The statistical image for the localizer was 
smoothed by a 4-mm radius hard sphere kernel. Each of the statistical images were 
masked by an additional image reflecting voxels in which the percent change in bold 
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signal from baseline differed for same-primed compared with unprimed objects (object 
priming effects) or faces compared with houses (FFA localizer). Thereafter, a peak (local 
extremum) search algorithm was used to identify the coordinates (Talairach and 
Tournoux, 1988) of activation peaks (P < .002, uncorrected) in the masked images. In 
each image, coordinate averaging combined peaks separated by less than 10-mm, and 
spheres (10-mm radius) were centered on each peak. Finally, spherical regions were 
masked to exclude voxels that did not reach a statistical threshold of P < .001 
(uncorrected). 
Region-based analyses were conducted on those regions identified in the voxel-
wise analyses. Object priming effects were assessed in a mixed factorial ANOVA in 
which time (at the seven time points) and prime type (same vs. different viewpoint vs. 
different exemplar vs. unprimed) and similarity (similar vs. dissimilar) were the within-
subject independent variables and task (object-decision vs. size-judgment) was the 
between-subject independent variables. The FFA was localized using a two-way, 
repeated measures ANOVA in which time (at the seven time points) and stimulus type 
(face vs. house) were the independent variables. 
Results 
Effect of Prime Type. 
Two regions within the fusiform cortex emerged from the voxel-wise ANOVA 
assessing object priming effects (Figure 6). Importantly, these regions were centered on 
coordinates in stereotactic space in the left fusiform gyrus (-48, -63, -11 [Figure 6A]) and 
the right fusiform gyrus (35, -55, -18 [Figure 6B]; Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) that 
were close to those found in previous studies exploring object priming effects (-40, -52, -
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6 and 46, -58, -6; Koutstaal et al., 2001; -45, -60, -18 and 42, -57, -18; Vuilleumier et al., 
2002; -45, -54, -24 and 48, -66, -15; Simons et al., 2003). Analyses of prime type were 
conducted with a f-test comparing activity for the different prime types averaging across 
the third and fourth time points (5-7.5-s post stimulus onset; i.e. the peak of the typical 
hemodynamic response function). This averaging assumes that meaningful differences 
between prime-types are observed at the peak of the response function. 
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Figure 6. Regions exhibiting neural priming effects in the fusiform cortex when 
collapsed across task and visual similarity: the left fusiform gyrus (A [-48, -63, 
-11]) mediated viewpoint-abstract and exemplar-specific priming; and the right 
fusiform gyrus (B [35, -55, -18]) mediated both viewpoint- and exemplar-specific 
priming. 
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In the LFG, analysis of the peak activity for different-viewpoint primed objects 
revealed greater percent signal change for unprimed objects (.24) than for different 
viewpoints of objects (.10), t(\9) = -2.86, P < .02. Moreover, the peak of the response 
for different viewpoint priming (.10) as compared with same primed objects (.02) is not 
statistically significant, t(l9) = -1.15, P > .26, consistent with viewpoint-abstract priming 
effects in this region. When the peak of the response for different exemplars (.18) is 
compared with that of unprimed objects (.24), the magnitude of activation does not 
significantly differ, t(\9) = -1.33, P > .20; however, activation for different exemplars 
does significantly differ from that of same primed objects, ?(19) = -2.31, P < .05, thus 
exhibiting exemplar-specific priming in this region (Figure 7A). The difference in 
activation patterns for different viewpoint (.10) and different exemplar (.18) primed 
objects approached significance, t{\9) = 1.79, P = .09, further suggesting that the LFG 
responds differently to these prime types. 
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Figure 7. Peak of the hemodynamic response for prime types in the LFG (A) 
demonstrating viewpoint-abstract and exemplar-specific priming, and in the RFG 
(B) demonstrating viewpoint- and exemplar-specific priming. 
Analyses of prime type in the RFG, revealed that the percent signal change for 
different viewpoints (.27) and different exemplars (.27) was greater than that for same-
primed objects (.005), f(19) = -3.53, P < .005 and t(l9) = -5.40, P < .001, but not 
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significantly different from unprimed objects (.32), ?(19) = -1.07, P > .29 and f(19) = -
1.11, P > .28 (Figure 7B). Taken together, these results demonstrate that the LFG 
mediates viewpoint-abstract and exemplar-specific priming, and the RFG mediates 
viewpoint- arid exemplar-specific priming. 
Effect of Task. 
Analyses of task effects were assessed in the LFG and RFG via a two-way, mixed 
factorial analysis of variance comparing activity averaged across the third and fourth time 
points. In the LFG, this analysis revealed that the interaction between prime type (same 
vs. different exemplar) and task (object-decision vs. size-judgment) was not significant, 
F( l ,18)= .03, P > .87, nor was the interaction significant when comparing different-
exemplar with unprimed objects, F(l , 18) = .67, P > .42. Similarly, in the RFG, the 
interaction between prime type (same vs. different-exemplar) and task (object-decision 
vs. size-judgment) was not significant, F(l , 18) = .45, P > .51, nor was it when the 
different exemplar and unprimed objects were compared, F(l , 18) = .36, P > .55. 
Effect of Visual Similarity. 
A median split of the similarity ratings obtained in the preliminary data collection 
determined visual similarity. The mean ratings obtained for those exemplar pairs 
considered similar (3.31) significantly differed from that of exemplar pairs considered 
dissimilar (4.77), t(29) = 31.41, P < .0001 (see Figure 8). 
Figure 8. Example of an exemplar pair rated as visually similar (A) and visually 
dissimilar (B). 
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Analyses of exemplar pair similarity in both the LFG and RFG were assessed via 
a two-way, repeated-measures analysis of variance comparing activity averaged across 
the third and fourth time points. In the LFG, when exemplars are separated by visual 
similarity, no interaction between prime type (same vs. different exemplar) and visual 
similarity (similar vs. dissimilar) exists, F(l , 19) = .89, P > .35. In contrast, the analysis 
in the RFG revealed that there is a significant interaction between prime type (same vs. 
different exemplar) and visual similarity (similar vs. dissimilar), F(l , 19) = 4.55, P < .05. 
Simple comparisons decomposing this interaction shows that the magnitude of the peak 
activation for different exemplar similar (.40) is significantly greater than that for 
different exemplar dissimilar (.13), f(19) = 2.17, P < .05. Moreover, the difference in 
activation for similar exemplars and same primed objects is significant, t{\9) = -3.95, P < 
.001; whereas there is no significant difference between dissimilar exemplars and same 
primed objects, /(19) = -.29, P > .11 (see Figure 9). 
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Figure 9. Peak of the hemodynamic response for visually similar (A) compared 
with visually dissimilar (B) exemplars in the RFG. Greater activation for visually 
similar exemplar pairs indicates exemplar specific priming (A), whereas a 
decrease in activation for dissimilar exemplar pairs indicates exemplar abstract 
priming (B). 
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Figure 10. Region within the RFG localized as the FFA (A [41,-55, -15]) 
exhibiting greater activation for faces as compared to houses (B) and both 
viewpoint- and exemplar-specific priming (C). 
FFA Localizer. 
One region emerged from the voxel-wise analysis designed to anatomically 
localize the fusiform face area (FFA). Critically, the region was centered on coordinates 
in stereotactic space (41,-55, -18 [Figure 10A]; Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) in a region 
consistent with previous studies (Kanwisher et al., 1997; Loffler et al., 2005), and close 
to the RFG region obtained in the voxel-wise analysis comparing activation differences 
between same and unprimed objects over the seven time points (35,-55, -15). Region-
based analysis revealed that this area within the RFG (41,-55, -18) shows greater peak 
activation for faces (.25) than houses (.10), *(19) = 5.53, P < .0001 (see Figure 10B), 
27 
which is characteristic of FFA activity. Analysis of objects in this area demonstrates a 
similar pattern of activation as found in the RFG region. First, it is important to note that 
this area mediates object priming, such that peak activation for same primed objects (.06) 
significantly differed for that of unprimed objects (.19), t(\9) = 3.10, P < .01. Moreover, 
the pattern of activation for different viewpoints (.16) and different exemplars (.14) was 
greater than that for primed objects (.06), t{\9) = 2.59, P < .05 and *(19) = 1.93, P < .07, 
implicating the role of this region for processing specific visual forms of object classes 
other than faces (Figure 10C). 
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Figure 11. Peak of the hemodynamic response for visually similar (A) compared 
with visually dissimilar (B) exemplars in the FFA. 
Effects of exemplar pair visual similarity were also assessed in the FFA, as 
patterns of activation in this region resembled that of the RFG, and the RFG 
demonstrated significant effects of this variable. A two-way, repeated-measures analysis 
of variance revealed that a significant interaction exists between prime type (same vs. 
different exemplar) and visual similarity (similar vs. dissimilar) in the region localized as 
the FFA, F(l , 19) = 6.01, P < .05. Accordingly, similar different exemplar primed 
objects (.23) exhibited greater activity than the dissimilar different exemplar primed 
objects (.06), t{\9) = 2.58, P < .02. The percent signal change for similar different 
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exemplars as compared to same primed objects significantly differed, t(l9) = 2.64, P < 
.02 (Figure 11 A); on the other hand, activation for dissimilar different exemplars was not 
statistically different from that of same primed objects, t(19) = -.37, P > .71 (Figure 1 IB). 
Interestingly, the peak activation for faces (.25) did not differ from that of visually similar 
exemplar pairs (.23), t(l9) = .54, P > .59. Likewise, the peak activation for houses (.10) 
did not differ from that of visually dissimilar exemplar pairs (.06), f(19) = .55, P > .58 
(Figure 12). 
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Figure 12. Within the FFA, activation patterns for visually similar and dissimilar 
exemplar pairs were analogous to those for faces and houses, respectively. 
Discussion 
In the present research, we investigated the effects of task demands and visual 
similarity on specific- and abstract-object recognition, in efforts to provide an explanation 
for differential findings of exemplar recognition obtained in previous neuroimaging 
experiments (Koutstaal et al., 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2002; Simons et al., 2003), and to 
replicate earlier findings of viewpoint recognition (Vuilleumier et al., 2002). To address 
possible shortcomings of designs failing to find exemplar-abstract recognition, this 
experiment obtained measures of name agreement and visual similarity for each exemplar 
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pair. We hypothesized that the contradictory findings could reflect task-dependent 
effects, in which the levels of processing required by each task might affect the extent to 
which an object was represented abstractly. Contrary to what was predicted, results 
revealed that in both the left and right fusiform gyri, the task did not differentially affect 
priming magnitudes of different viewpoint or different exemplar primed objects, 
suggesting that this area is not sensitive to the demands of the tasks used. Therefore, the 
remainder of this discussion will focus on priming effects in the fusiform cortex when 
collapsed across task. 
The analyses revealed two regions within the right and left fusiform gyri that 
demonstrated priming effects. Within these regions, we investigated the priming 
magnitude for different viewpoint and different exemplar primed objects. In line with 
previous findings, the results implicate the role of the LFG in storing objects in an 
viewpoint-abstract manner and the role of the RFG in storing objects in a viewpoint-
specific manner (Vuilleumier et al., 2002). On the other hand, the results suggest that the 
RFG and LFG store objects in an exemplar-specific manner. Thus, in regards to both 
viewpoint and exemplar priming, these findings replicate those obtained by Vuilleumier 
and colleagues (2002), but contradict those implicating LFG involvement in exemplar-
abstract recognition acquired in previous experiments (Koutstaal et al., 2001; Simons et 
al., 2003). 
Some have argued that visually dissimilar exemplar pairs might not prime one 
another, specifically because the likelihood of such pairs sharing the same name 
decreases with visual similarity. Thus, previous results not demonstrating exemplar-
abstract priming in LFG may reflect this methodological problem (Simons et al., 2003). 
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Unfortunately, exemplar pair naming agreement data was not reported in this study 
(Vuilleumier et al., 2002), therefore, it is difficult to assess whether or not the discrepant 
findings are due to one or both of these factors. In the present experiment, all exemplar 
pairs share a common name, but the extent to which pairs are visually similar varies. 
Results assessing whether or not visual similarity of exemplar pairs differentially affects 
abstract recognition in the LFG imply that this is not the case. Exemplar-specific priming 
was observed for both visually similar and dissimilar exemplar pairs when assessed in the 
LFG. Therefore, findings of exemplar-specific priming in LFG obtained in this study and 
a previous experiment (Vuilleumier et al., 2002) cannot be due to exemplar pair visual 
similarity. 
While the recognition-by-components (RBC) model of object recognition posits 
that exemplar abstract recognition is achieved by matching similar geons from one 
exemplar to another (Biederman, 1987), experiments assessing this model imply that 
abstract recognition of different viewpoints of an object relies on somewhat different 
processes than that required for abstract recognition of different exemplars of an object 
(Biederman & Cooper, 1991; Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993). In particular, 
Biederman and Cooper (1991) demonstrated that priming for contour-deleted images 
relied on whether or not the basic components, or geons, were present in both the initial 
encoding image and the complementary image shown at test; however, the magnitude of 
priming for contour-deleted different exemplar primed objects was less than that for 
complementary images of same primed objects, and did not depend on overlapping 
geons. The authors suggest that the different exemplar objects represent nonvisual 
benefits of name and concept priming. Similarly, another experiment comparing naming 
31 
latencies for different viewpoints and different exemplars of objects found that repeated 
presentations of different viewpoints of objects had a sizeable response time advantage 
over different exemplar primed objects. Moreover, the factor that affected the magnitude 
of priming was whether or not the geon structural descriptions could be recovered from 
each rotated image (Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993). Taken together, these findings 
suggest that viewpoint abstract recognition is a bottom-up, visual process achieved by 
matching geon structural descriptions from one viewpoint of an object to a different 
viewpoint of that object. In contrast, exemplar abstract recognition represents top-down 
conceptual processes that rely heavily on stored knowledge of objects. Interestingly, an 
fMRI experiment provides evidence that the fusiform cortex represents geons of objects, 
rather than object concepts, as contour deleted same, but not different exemplar, primed 
images resulted in repetition suppression (Hayworth & Biederman, 2006). Thus, 
viewpoint abstract recognition relies on a different process than that required for 
exemplar abstract recognition, and the fusiform cortex appears to be sensitive to geon 
structural descriptions involved in the recognition of different viewpoints of an object, 
but not in the processing of abstract visual form information necessary for the recognition 
of different exemplars of objects. 
What remains unclear is why other neuroimaging experiments demonstrate 
exemplar abstract recognition in the fusiform cortex (Koutstaal et al., 2001; Simons et al., 
2003) if this area mediates processes by which visual, but not abstract visual form, 
priming occurs. It is possible that the previous demonstrations of exemplar-abstract 
priming effects in LFG are due to a form of decision learning, termed response learning, 
that has been found to mediate repetition suppression effects when the same tasks are 
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used in both encoding and testing phases (Dobbins, Schnyer, Verfaellie, & Schacter, 
2004), as these experiments had participants perform the size-judgment task for both 
encoding and testing phases (Koutstaal et al., 2001; Simons et al., 2003). Therefore, 
reductions in neuronal activity for different exemplars of objects observed in these 
experiments may not actually reflect priming of objects, per se, but are more likely a 
product of response learning. 
Unexpectedly, however, visual similarity of exemplars pairs differentially 
affected priming magnitudes when assessed in the RFC Most notably, further analyses 
of this finding revealed that priming magnitude for similar exemplar pairs was less than 
that of dissimilar exemplar pairs. In other words, the similar exemplar pairs led to an 
increase of activation, indicating exemplar-specific recognition; however, dissimilar 
exemplar pairs led to a decrease of activation, indicating exemplar-abstract recognition. 
Moreover, when visual similarity was assessed in the fusiform face area (FFA), the same 
effect was obtained. While at first these results seem confusing, as one might expect this 
area to mediate the specific recognition of objects, the interpretations and implications of 
these findings become clearer when evaluated in terms of shared characteristics between 
visually similar exemplar pairs and faces. Different exemplars of faces tend to be 
visually similar representations of "face" whereas different exemplars of houses tend to 
be visually dissimilar representations of "house". Accordingly, the results from this 
experiment reveal that activation patterns for faces did not differ from those of similar 
exemplar pairs, and activation patterns for houses did not differ from those of dissimilar 
pairs. Therefore, we interpret these findings to suggest that the RFG, and more 
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specifically the FFA, may be recruited for the disambiguation of visually similar 
exemplar pairs, such as faces. 
While previous experiments assessing the FFA don't typically utilize a priming 
paradigm, the methodology can be thought of in terms of different exemplar priming. In 
these experiments, subjects view several unknown, or exemplars of, faces and houses, in 
which each consecutive stimulus is primed by its abstract visual representation. 
Increased activation in the FFA for faces as compared to houses could merely reflect the 
idea that bottom-up processing increases with greater the perceptual demands of 
disambiguating one visually similar object from the next. On the other hand, decreased 
activation for houses may be the result of conceptual priming in the absence of requiring 
bottom-up processes for disambiguation (see Bar et al., 2006 for a similar idea). 
However, it should be noted that this finding and explanation for RFG and FFA 
sensitivity to visual similarity diverges from both the RBC model of object recognition 
and previous experiments evaluating different exemplar priming. First, the RBC model 
would predict that similar, but not dissimilar, exemplar pairs would prime one another 
due to the fact that similar pairs share many basic components. Moreover, a previous 
neuroimaging experiment suggests the fusiform cortex represents geon, and not abstract 
visual, information (Hayworth & Biederman, 2006). Lastly, a divided visual field study 
found exemplar abstract priming when visually similar, but not visually dissimilar, forms 
were presented to the right hemisphere (Marsolek, 2004). Although the findings from the 
present experiment implicate the role of the FFA in processing more than just faces 
and/or objects of perceptual expertise, these results are in need of further assessment, as 
they contradict predictions based on previous experiments. Therefore, in attempts to 
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replicate these findings, we conducted a second experiment designed to specifically test 
visual similarity, as this variable was not manipulated in the first experiment. 
Experiment 2 
The first experiment found an effect of exemplar pair similarity in the right 
fusiform gyrus (RFG), including the fusiform face area (FFA), revealing that this area is 
sensitive to visual similarity of different exemplars with a common name. Specifically, 
visually similar exemplar pairs exhibited greater activation than those that were rated as 
dissimilar in both the RFG and localized FFA, suggesting that this area mediates abstract 
recognition of objects when an exemplar is visually dissimilar from its corresponding 
exemplar. These findings also suggest that the FFA is not just a face area, but also an 
area that processes any visually similar exemplars of the same object name to a greater 
extent than those that are visually dissimilar. Experiments suggesting the role of a 
domain-specific "face area" (Kanwisher et al., 1997; McCarthy et al., 1997; Kanwisher et 
al., 1998; Yovel & Kanwisher, 2004; Loffler et al., 2005) could reflect this idea in that 
faces are visually similar whereas houses are not. A neuroimaging study examining the 
patterns of activation for a mean, or prototypical, face compared with faces that deviated 
from the mean on a continuum, found that faces around the mean resulted in greater FFA 
activation that those that were farthest from the mean (Loffler et al., 2005). In line with 
our findings, these results suggest that FFA activation increased when faces were visually 
similar (around the mean), but decreased when they were dissimilar. 
While these unexpected findings seem to provide compelling evidence that the 
RFG responds differently to visually similar and dissimilar exemplars, the direction of 
these differences contradict both models and previous findings of visual similarity effects 
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on object recognition. In particular, RBC model of object recognition posits that object 
recognition is achieved through the perception of basic components termed geons, which 
are then arranged and matched onto representations stored in memory (Biederman, 1987; 
Hummel & Biederman, 1992). Abstract recognition of different exemplars of objects 
requires that the geon structural configuration is similar across exemplars (Biederman, 
1987). Thus, this model would predict that visually similar exemplars, consisting of 
analogous geon structural configurations, would prime one another, but visually 
dissimilar exemplars would not. In line with this prediction, a divided visual field study 
investigating visual similarity effects on letter-case priming found that letter strings with 
visually similar upper and lower case forms demonstrated abstract recognition when 
presented to the right hemisphere; however, priming was not observed for visually 
dissimilar upper and lower case letter forms (Marsolek, 2004). Therefore, it is surprising 
that Experiment 1 demonstrated an opposite effect of similarity such that the RFG and 
FFA mediated priming for visually dissimilar, but not similar, exemplar pairs. 
Although the results from Experiment 1 diverge from what might be predicted, 
the findings of FFA differential activation for visually similar and dissimilar exemplar 
pairs may provide an explanation. The first experiment demonstrated that the activation 
for faces and similar exemplar pairs did not differ, and the activation for houses and 
dissimilar exemplar pairs did not differ, suggesting that faces and houses fall into the 
classification of similar and dissimilar exemplars, respectively. Therefore, the FFA may 
not be a domain-specific area mediating the recognition of faces, but instead a process-
specific area that is recruited for discriminating between visually similar exemplars, a 
process required for specific object recognition. While process-specific accounts of FFA 
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activation have focused on the idea that this area mediates recognition of objects with 
which one has perceptual expertise, these findings could also be interpreted in terms of 
visual similarity, as the experts performing the task viewed different exemplars of the 
same object (i.e. birds), which happened to be visually similar to one another (Gauthier et 
al.,2000). 
The aim of this study is to directly test the hypothesis that the FFA processes 
visually similar exemplars of any object class to a greater extent than those that are 
visually dissimilar. Since the basis for defining similar and dissimilar exemplar pairs in 
the first experiment relied on ratings that subsequently split the exemplar pairs into the 
two corresponding groups, it is important that the effects of similarity be directly 
manipulated to further test this hypothesis. Accordingly, this experiment only looked at 
priming effects in the FFA, as this is a strong test of the process-specific hypothesis. 
Within the localized FFA region, this experiment examines neural correlates associated 
with repetition of the same object, a visually similar different exemplar of an object, or a 
visually dissimilar exemplar of an object, as compared to that of novel, or unrepeated 
objects. If priming is observed in the FFA for visually dissimilar exemplar pairs, but not 
visually similar exemplar pairs, it would suggest that these areas are sensitive to visual 
similarity and thus process visually similar exemplars to a greater extent than those that 
are visually dissimilar. In line with this argument, it is expected that different exemplars 
of faces presented during the localizer task will demonstrate greater neuronal activity as 
compared to that observed with different exemplars of houses. Moreover, the activation 
patterns associated with faces and houses are expected to correspond with those for 
similar and dissimilar exemplar pairs, respectively, suggesting that these stimuli fall into 
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the analogous stimulus classifications. Therefore, if FFA activation for faces corresponds 
to that found with visually similar exemplar pairs, it would imply that greater FFA 
activation for faces does not reflect a face-specific processing area, but an area 
specialized for processing and disambiguating between visually similar exemplars of an 
object. 
Method 
Design. 
A one-way repeated measures design was utilized for this experiment, in which 
prime type (unprimed vs. same vs. different exemplar similar vs. different exemplar 
dissimilar) is the within subjects variable. 
Subjects. 
Twenty-two volunteers from Rice University, Baylor College of Medicine, and 
the University of Texas Medical School (11 male; mean age 21) participated in the 
neuroimaging study. All subjects completed a screening questionnaire to ensure they did 
not have a history of neurological or psychiatric problems. Moreover, subjects were all 
right-handed, and had normal, or corrected-to-normal vision. Informed consent within 
the guidelines set forth and permitted by the Institutional Review Board at Rice 
University was received from each subject. Subjects were paid for their participation. 
Materials. 
Stimuli includes some of the exemplar pairs from the first experiment, in addition 
to either a visually similar or dissimilar exemplar pair, constituting a total of 40 objects 
for the purposes of collecting norming data. For each of the 40 objects, a similar and 
dissimilar exemplar was selected. Ten subjects participated in the normative behavioral 
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study. Subjects were native English speaking Rice University undergraduate and 
graduate students who either received course-credit in their psychology classes or 
payment for participating. Informed consent was obtained, and after completing the 
experiment, subjects received a debriefing form explaining the purpose of the 
experiment. 
In the normative behavioral study, stimuli were presented on a computer screen 
and subjects were prompted to type in the name of the object. The trial advanced to the 
next object when the subject pressed the space bar, which signified a completed response. 
Exemplars were presented in a pseudorandom order that ensured different exemplars of 
the same object were spaced throughout the trial. Once subjects completed the naming 
task, they then rated exemplar pair visual similarity. For this task, pictures of each 
exemplar pair situated next to one another appeared above a rating scale of one, very 
dissimilar, to six, very similar. Subjects were instructed to rate the exemplar pairs based 
on how visually similar they appear by pressing the corresponding number keys on the 
keyboard. For these ratings, subjects were instructed to distribute their responses across 
all six points rather than always respond with a one or six. 
Based on the naming and rating data, 36 of the 40 objects presented were selected 
for use in the fMRI experiment, comprising a total of 108 objects: a test item with both a 
similar and dissimilar exemplar. All exemplars of an object obtained at least 85% name 
agreement, and the mean similarity rating for similar exemplar pairs (4.87) is greater than 
that for dissimilar exemplar pairs (3.18), t(35) = 18.07, P < .0001. For an example of a 
test object and its corresponding visually similar and dissimilar exemplar, refer to Figure 
13. The presentation of objects was counterbalanced on measures of similarity. This 
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experiment also included 36 nonobjects, 30 faces, and 30 houses. Thirty of the 
nonobjects are the same as those used in Experiment 1, and six more were selected from 
the same stimuli set (Burgund, 2000) in order to have an equal number of objects and 
nonobjects. In addition to the 26 houses (http://www.turbosquid.com/) from Experiment 
1, four more images of houses were selected in order to obtain a total of 30. The 
proposed experiment also used seven Caucasian female faces from Experiment 1; 
however, in order to maximize similarity among faces, 23 more faces of the same sex and 
race were selected from the same database (http://www.tarrlab.org/). 
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Figure 13. Example of a test object (A) with its corresponding visually similar (B) 
and visually dissimilar (C) exemplar pair. For each test object, subjects saw 
either the visually similar or visually dissimilar exemplar during the encoding 
phase. 
All images were presented centrally, in grayscale against a white background, and 
subtended approximately 2° x 2° of visual angle. Presentations, response-time 
measurement, object naming data, and similarity ratings were controlled by the PsyScope 
software package (Cohen et al., 1993). 
40 
Procedure. 
The procedure of the fMRI experiment was the same as that in the first 
experiment with two exceptions. First, subjects only performed the object-decision task 
during the test phase, since the previous experiment did not find task effects. Second, 
instead of including different viewpoint prime types, this experiment included different 
exemplars that are either visually similar or dissimilar to the target exemplar. The objects 
were split in half so that for each object, subjects saw either the similar or dissimilar 
exemplar during the encoding phase where the test object remains constant for all 
subjects. 
Subjects completed two runs of the encoding task and two runs of the testing task. 
The encoding task is the same as Experiment 1, and thereafter, subjects performed the 
object-decision task during the test phase. The presentation of objects was administered 
in different counterbalanced orders. In each trial, no more than three runs of the same 
prime type (unprimed vs. same vs. different exemplar similar vs. different exemplar 
dissimilar) or stimulus type (object vs. nonobject) appeared consecutively. Immediately 
following the test phase, subjects completed the same localizer task as used in 
Experiment 1. No more than three faces or houses appeared consecutively during the 
localizer task. The approximate length of each run was five minutes for encoding, four 
minutes during testing, and three minutes for the localizer. 
Image Acquisition. 
These parameters were the same as those in Experiment 1. 
Image Analysis. 
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Data from each subject were preprocessed in the same manner as that in 
Experiment 1. Likewise, preprocessed data were analyzed using the General Linear 
Model (GLM; Friston et al., 1994; Josephs et al., 1997; Miezen et al., 2000; Zarahn et al., 
1997) in the FIDL analysis package (http://www.nil.wustl.edu/~fidl), as in Experiment 1. 
Neural signals for the four conditions of interest [prime (4)] to assess priming effects and 
for the two conditions of interest [faces vs. houses] to localize the FFA were modeled in 
the GLM across the seven time points (i.e., image acquisitions), beginning immediately 
after stimulus onset. The procedure for modeling the conditions in the GLM was 
identical to that of Experiment 1 with the one exception that the number and type of 
conditions modeled were different (see Experiment 1 Image Analysis section for 
reference). 
Regions of interest localizing the FFA were defined based on a voxel-wise 
analysis, in which a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA where time (at the seven time 
points) and stimulus type (face vs. house) were the independent variables. The statistical 
image was smoothed with a 3-mm radius hard sphere kernel, and then masked by an 
additional image reflecting voxels in which the percent signal change of the bold signal 
from baseline differed for faces compared with houses. A peak (local extremum) search 
algorithm was used to identify the coordinates (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) of 
activation peaks (P < .01, uncorrected) in the masked images. Thereafter, coordinate 
averaging combined peaks separated by less than 10-mm, and spheres (10-mm radius) 
were centered on each peak. Lastly, masks were placed on the spherical images to 
exclude voxels that did not reach a statistical threshold of P < .05 (uncorrected). 
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Region-based analyses were conducted on the area defined in the voxel-wise 
analysis. The FFA was localized using a two-way, repeated measures ANOVA in which 
time (at the seven time points) and stimulus type (face vs. house) were the independent 
variables. 
Results 
FFA Localizer. 
One RFG region emerged from the voxel-wise analysis designed to anatomically 
localize the FFA. Most importantly, this region was centered on coordinates in 
stereotactic space (41,-61, -18 [Figure 14A]; Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) that was in 
close proximity to the FFA region of interest obtained in Experiment 1 (41, -55, -15). A 
region-based analysis revealed that this area shows greater peak activation for faces (.51) 
than houses (.30), t(21) = 3.23, P < .005 (see Figure 14B), which is characteristic of FFA 
activity. 
Figure 14. Region within the RFG localized as the FFA (A [41, -62, -18]) 
exhibiting greater activation for faces, shown in red, as compared to houses, 
shown in blue (B). 
Analysis of objects in the FFA shows a trend for object priming such that the peak 
activation for same primed objects (.39) was less than that for unprimed objects (.52), 
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t(2l) = 1.68, P < .11; however, the results do not suggest that the FFA responds 
differently to the similarity of exemplar pairs. That is, similar exemplar pairs (.39) did 
not differ from that of same primed (.39) or unprimed (.52) objects, t(2l) = .02, P = .98 
and r(21) = 1.50, P = .15. Moreover, dissimilar exemplar pairs (.44) did not differ from 
that of same primed (.39) and unprimed (.52) objects, t(2l) = 1.12, P < .28 and /(21) = 
.90, P < .38. Likewise, the difference between similar exemplar pairs (.39) and dissimilar 
exemplar pairs (.44) was not significant, ?(21) = 1.08, P < .29 (Figure 15). To further 
determine whether or not faces and houses can be considered similar and dissimilar 
exemplars, respectively, analyses were performed comparing activation patterns for these 
variables. The difference between the peak activation for faces (.51) and similar 
exemplar pairs (.39) approached significance, f(21) = 1.75, P < .10; whereas the 
difference between the peak activation for houses (.30) and dissimilar exemplar pairs was 
significant, ?(21) = 2.35, P < .05. Therefore, it appears as though faces and houses were 
not processed in the same manner as the aforementioned classifications described above. 
Same 
Similar 
Dissimilar 
Unprimed 
Figure 15. FFA activation patterns for the four prime types demonstrating no 
significant differences between visually similar and visually dissimilar exemplar 
FFA 
Time (in sec) 
pairs. 
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Discussion 
This experiment attempted to explain the findings of visual similarity effects 
obtained in Experiment 1 by directly manipulating visual similarity of objects. Previous 
research debates the issue of whether or not the FFA is a face-specific area (Kanwisher et 
al., 1997; McCarthy et al., 1997; Kanwisher et al., 1998; Yovel & Kanwisher, 2004; 
Loffler et al., 2005) or a processes-specific area developed through perceptual expertise 
with one class of objects (Tarr & Gauthier, 2000; Gauthier et al., 1997; Gauthier et al., 
1999; Gauthier et al., 2000; Gauthier et al., 2000). The results from Experiment 1 
suggest that this area is process-specific in that it mediates specific recognition for 
objects that are visually similar. We hypothesized that the FFA may process visually 
similar exemplars to a greater extent than those that are visually dissimilar in order to 
disambiguate one exemplar from another. However, the results from the present 
experiment imply that this is not the case. That is, the activation patterns associated with 
visually similar and visually dissimilar exemplar pairs did not differ. Furthermore, the 
activation for faces differed from that of similar exemplar pairs, whereas the activation 
for houses differed from that of dissimilar exemplar pairs, implying that faces and houses 
were not processed in an analogous manner to that of similar and dissimilar exemplars, 
respectively. 
The finding that FFA activation was not sensitive to variations in the visual 
similarity of exemplar pairs is in line with both the RBC model of object recognition 
(Biederman, 1987; Hummel & Biederman, 1992) and previous findings of similarity 
effects (Marsolek, 2004). Thus, it is possible that the visual similarity effects obtained in 
the first experiment reflect a methodological problem in the way that similarity was 
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defined. As previously noted, effects of visual similarity were assessed by splitting the 
exemplar pairs into two groups based on the similarity ratings obtained from the norming 
study. However, the stronger test of visual similarity effects used in the present 
experiment provides evidence that this factor does not differentially affect priming in the 
fusiform cortex. 
General Discussion 
In these experiments, we examine possible explanations for why previous 
research (Koutstaal et al., 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2002; Simons et al., 2003) provides 
mixed support for the dissociable subsystems theory of object recognition. While the role 
of a specific visual form (SVF) subsystem consistently demonstrates that it operates more 
effectively in the right hemisphere, support for the role of an abstract visual form (AVF) 
subsystem operating more effectively in the left hemisphere is unclear. That is, the 
dissociable subsystems theory suggests that the left hemisphere supports both viewpoint 
and exemplar abstract recognition (Marsolek, 1999; Burgund & Marsolek, 2000; 
Burgund, 2000), but neuroimaging experiments reveal divergent findings in regards to 
abstract recognition of different exemplars in the left hemisphere (Vuilluemier et al., 
2002; Koutstaal et al., 2001; Simons et al., 2003). In particular, some experiments 
demonstrate exemplar abstract recognition in the LFG (Koutstaal et al., 2001; Simons et 
al., 2003), while another implicates this region in the recognition of specific exemplars 
(Vuilleumier et al., 2002). In Experiment 1, we investigated the possible effects of task 
and visual similarity on exemplar abstract recognition, as both the processing demands of 
the task and the overlap of basic visual components across exemplars could affect the 
magnitude of priming; however, the results revealed that the LFG mediates viewpoint, 
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but not exemplar, abstract recognition, and neither task nor visual similarity differentially 
affected LFG activation. Conversely, the RFG, including the fusiform face area (FFA), 
demonstrated an effect of visual similarity such that specific recognition was observed for 
similar exemplar pairs, yet abstract recognition was observed for dissimilar exemplar 
pairs. When compared with activation for faces and houses in the FFA, neural responses 
for similar exemplars were analogous to that for faces and activation patterns for 
dissimilar exemplar pairs were analogous to that for houses. In Experiment 2, we tested 
the hypothesis that the FFA is a process-specific area that is recruited when the 
perceptual demands of disambiguating one similar exemplar from another are high. This 
experiment used a more stringent measure of visual similarity from that used in 
Experiment 1, and did not find an effect of visual similarity in the FFA, suggesting that 
the results from Experiment 1 were due to an issue in how visual similarity was defined. 
In both Experiments 1 and 2, findings reveal that a SVF subsystem operates more 
effectively in the right hemisphere, in which the RFG is recruited for this process. Yet, in 
contrast to some studies (Marsolek, 1995,1999,2004), the findings reveal that an AVF 
subsystem mediated by the LFG is involved in abstract recognition of different 
viewpoints of an object, but not for different exemplars of an object. Although these 
findings contradict those found in some neuroimaging experiments (Koutstaal et al., 
2001; Simons et al., 2003), they support results assessing the recognition-by-components 
(RBC) model of object recognition (Biederman & Cooper, 1991; Biederman & 
Gerhardstein, 1993; Hay worth & Biederman, 2006). In particular, the RBC model of 
object recognition suggests that abstract recognition of different viewpoints of an object 
is achieved through different processes than that for exemplar abstract recognition. That 
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is, viewpoint abstract recognition represents visual priming based on geon matching from 
one viewpoint to another; on the other hand, exemplar abstract recognition represents 
abstract visual form priming based on nonvisual properties of objects belonging to the 
same class with a common name. Critically, an fMRI study provides evidence that the 
fusiform cortex represents geons of objects, but does not represent conceptual 
information (Hayworth & Biederman, 2006). To this end, it appears as though the 
fusiform cortex mediates viewpoint, but not exemplar, abstract recognition, which is in 
line with the findings from the current experiments. This, however, does not necessarily 
refute the dissociable subsystems theory; it merely suggests that AVF subsystems that 
operate more efficiently in the left hemisphere may be localized in different regions of 
the brain. While the AVF subsystem recruited for viewpoint abstract recognition is 
located in the LFG, it's possible that a different left hemisphere region is involved in 
exemplar abstract recognition. In line with this idea, a number of studies demonstrate 
that regions within the prefrontal cortex respond to different exemplars of an object 
(Freedman, Riesenbuer, Poggio, & Miller, 2002; Freedman, Riesenhuber, Poggio, & 
Miller, 2003), which is thought to signify lexico-semantic processing (Vuilleumier et al., 
2002; Buckner, Koutstaal, Schacter, & Rosen, 2000; Wagner, Koutstaal, Maril, Schacter, 
& Buckner, 2000). 
Taken together, these findings highlight the shortcomings of both the RBC model 
and dissociable subsystems theory of object recognition. That is, neither explanation 
provides an explicit description of how a visual input form can be both specifically 
identified as a particular object while also abstractly recognized as being the same object 
from a different view or as belonging to a class of objects that share a common name. 
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While the RBC model can account for viewpoint invariance, it lacks a neuroanatomically 
feasible explanation for the parallel nature of both specific and abstract visual form 
processes, as this model assumes a single system for object recognition. The dissociable 
subsystems theory solves this problem by demonstrating that there are hemispheric 
asymmetries in the two types of processes, but this theory falls short in that it cannot 
account for separable neural networks that have been found in the present experiments 
and previous experiments (Vuilleumier et al., 2002; Hay worth & Biederman, 2006) to 
underlie the abstract recognition of viewpoints as compared with that of exemplars. 
Thus, a full account of specific and abstract object recognition that describes both the 
processes for recognizing a different viewpoint of an object compared with a different 
exemplar of an object class and the neural networks implicated in such tasks is in need. 
In order to understand the neuronal processes involved, we turn to a computational model 
proposed by Riesenhuber and Poggio (1999,2000,2002) that provides a plausible 
explanation for the findings from our experiments and others (Vuilleumier et al., 2002; 
Hay worth & Biederman, 2006). We will begin first with a brief description of the 
computational model, and then discuss how this model can be extended to encompass 
data from several object recognition experiments discussed previously in this paper 
(Vuillleumier et al., 2002; Hayworth & Biederman, 2006; Burgund & Maroslek, 2000; 
Marsolek, 1999; Burgund, 2000; Biederman & Cooper, 1991; Biederman & 
Gerhardstein, 1993; Koutstaal et al., 2001; Simons et al., 2003; Kanwisher et al., 1997; 
McCarthy et al., 1997; Kanwisher et al., 1998; Yovel & Kanwisher, 2004; Loffler et al., 
2005; Tarr & Gauthier, 2000; Gauthier et al., 1997; Gauthier et al., 1999; Gauthier et al., 
2000; Gauthier et al., 2000). 
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Single cell recordings of primates have led to the development of a computational 
model (Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999,2000,2002) that helps to describe the neurological 
underpinnings of object recognition. This model assumes a simple, feed-forward, 
hierarchical structure, in which the cells in early visual areas project information to later 
areas in the ventral stream. The cells in VI are known to have small receptive fields and 
respond to simple bar like structures. As one proceeds through the ventral stream, the 
receptive fields become increasingly larger, and respond to more complex stimuli, such 
as faces (Tanaka, 1996; Logothetis & Sheinberg, 1996; Perrett, Hietanen, Oram, & 
Benson, 1992; Logothetis, Pauls, & Poggio, 1995). Due to the neuroanatomical 
properties of the cells in the ventral stream, the model makes explicit assumptions as to 
how areas from VI to the lateral occipital complex (LOC) respond to visual stimuli and 
how the information garnered in these areas is sent to the prefrontal cortex to perform 
tasks such as categorization. 
In their computation model, Riesenhuber and Poggio (1999,2000,2002) propose 
that the ventral stream is made up of simple cells that respond to specific properties of an 
object, such as line orientation, and complex cells that represent view-tuned and view-
invariant information. The simple cells are located in areas VI through V4, in which 
each successive region pools the information from the preceding region in order to 
represent more complex properties of the whole object. V4 then projects information to 
the LOC, which contains view-tuned and view-invariant cells (Logothetis et al., 1995). 
The view-tuned cells, which are mostly located in posterior portions of the LOC, pool the 
information received by V4, and respond only to the particular view of an object. The 
view-tuned cells project afferents to anterior regions of the LOC, also known as the 
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fusiform cortex, which are then pooled together to match neurons that represent the 
whole object, or those neurons that are view-invariant. Tasks such as categorization are 
performed by circuits located in the prefrontal cortex (Freedman et al., 2002; Freedman et 
al., 2003), which receive inputs from the view-invariant cells (Riesenhuber & Poggio, 
1999,2000,2002). By this account, the anterior portions of the LOC mediate 
recognizing an object from a different viewpoint, and the prefrontal cortex mediates the 
recognition for different exemplars of an object. 
Riesenhuber and Poggio's (1999,2000,2002) computational model provides not 
only a good framework for explaining the neuronal processes by which object recognition 
is achieved, but also addresses the shortcomings of previous theories (Biederman, 1987; 
Hummel & Biederman, 1992; Marsolek, 1999; Burgund & Marsolek, 2000). That is, the 
predictions from this model are in line with data suggesting that the fusiform cortex 
represents object shape information, but not object category membership information 
(Vuilleumier et al., 2002; Hay worth & Biederman, 2006). While these predictions are in 
line with an fMRI study assessing the RBC model of object recognition (Hay worth & 
Biederman, 2006), the computational model expands on this idea by providing an explicit 
account of how the LOC mediates both specific and viewpoint abstract object 
recognition. The key feature here is that the LOC contains both view-tuned and view-
invariant cells (Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999,2000,2002; Logothetis et al., 1995), which 
helps to explain how the specific identification of an object and the abstract recognition 
of that object from a different viewpoint operate in parallel. Moreover, the computational 
model confirms behavioral studies assessing the RBC model that suggest abstract 
recognition for exemplars of an object class is achieved by different processes than that 
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for viewpoints of the same object (Biederman & Cooper, 1991; Biederman & 
Gerhardstein, 1993). That is, Riesenhuber and Poggio (1999,2000,2002) propose that 
the prefrontal cortex retrieves information about the visual properties of an object from 
the LOC in order to make judgments of subordinate and superordinate category 
membership. Therefore, recognizing the same object at different viewpoints is performed 
at earlier stages in the ventral stream and relies primarily on visual properties retrieved 
from each view. In contrast, recognizing an object as belonging to a class of objects 
occurs at later stages of visual form processing, and relies primarily on lexico-semantic 
processes. This aspect of the model (Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999,2000,2002) also 
addresses the problem encountered with the dissociable subsystems theory in that it 
differentiates between the neural networks involved in abstract viewpoint and abstract 
exemplar recognition. However, one limitation of the computational model proposed by 
Riesenhuber and Poggio (1999,2000,2002) is that it does not make any explicit claims 
about hemispheric asymmetries thought to be involved in specific and abstract object 
recognition. 
Although Riesenhuber and Poggio (2000) do not address the issue of hemispheric 
asymmetries in terms of the types of cells located in the right versus left LOC, it is 
important to extend their model to include this factor, as it has been demonstrated 
consistently in the literature (Marolek, 1999; Burgund & Marsolek, 2000; Burgund, 
2000; Marsolek, 2004; Koutstaal et al., 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2002; Simons et al., 
2003). To this end, it is expected that the ratio of view-invariant to view-tuned cells in 
the left anterior LOC is greater than that in the right anterior LOC. This extension of the 
model offers an explanation for why SVF subsystems are more effective in the right 
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hemisphere and AVF subsystems for recognizing different viewpoints of an object are 
more effective in the left hemisphere (Burgund & Marsolek, 2000; Burgund, 2000). 
Together the computational model (Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999,2000,2002) and the 
proposed extension provide a reasonable explanation for the findings from the current 
experiments, while also addressing the shortcomings of both the RBC model and 
dissociable subsystems theory of object recognition. 
Additionally, the proposition that the right anterior LOC contains a greater 
number of view-tuned than view-invariant cells can also account for the finding that an 
area located within the RFG, the FFA, responds preferentially to faces (Kanwisher et al., 
1997; McCarthy et al., 1997; Kanwisher et al., 1998; Yovel & Kanwisher, 2004; Loffler 
et al., 2005) and classes of objects with which one has perceptual expertise (Tarr & 
Gauthier, 2000; Gauthier et al., 1997; Gauthier et al., 1999; Gauthier et al., 2000; 
Gauthier et al., 2000). Since view-tuned cells are sensitive to the specific orientation of 
an object, it could be assumed that these cells mediate holistic and configural processes 
thought to be involved in face and expert recognition, as these are the hallmarks of 
subordinate level processing. Moreover, the viewpoint sensitivity of large populations of 
view-tuned cells in the FFA would give rise to phenomenon such as the face inversion 
effect (Farah, Tanaka, & Drain, 1995; Freire, Lee, & Symons, 2000; Reed, Stone, Grubb, 
& McGoldrick, 2006) and inversion effects found in dog experts when recognizing 
pictures of dogs (Diamond & Carey, 1986). Thus, the inclusion of a distinction between 
the ratio of view-tuned to view-invariant cells in the right versus left anterior LOC is 
essential in order to explain FFA activity as well. 
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In conclusion, the LOC represents view-dependent and view-invariant object 
information. Simple cells in early visual areas respond to specific features of an object, 
such as line orientation. The LOC pools the information from simple cells, and the view-
tuned and view-invariant cells located within the LOC support the specific identification 
of an object and the abstract recognition of that object from a different viewpoint. In 
order to account for hemispheric asymmetries, we propose that the RFG is mostly made 
up of view-tuned cells which mediate the specific recognition of both objects and faces, 
while the LFG contains a greater number of view-invariant cells which give rise to the 
abstract recognition of an object when presented at different viewpoints. While the LOC 
is recruited for the identification of a specific object and the abstract recognition of that 
object from a different viewpoint, the prefrontal cortex mediates abstract recognition for 
different exemplars of an object. The view-invariant cells located within the LFG send 
signals to the prefrontal cortex, in which the classification of an object based on 
subordinate or superordinate levels is achieved. Thus, exemplar abstract object 
recognition recruits frontal regions involved in lexico-semantic processes, but viewpoint 
abstract recognition can be performed at earlier stages of visual input processing that 
recruit the anterior regions of the left LOC known as the left fusiform cortex. Because 
the model focuses on bottom-up processes, it is still a question as to how top-down 
influences, such as response learning (Dobbins et al., 2004) affect object recognition and 
LFG activation. Riesenhuber and Poggio (1999,2000,2002) speculate that task learning 
may affect LOC activation, but do not actually model these processes. Future research is 
needed to assess the effect of task learning of fusiform activity in order to address the 
potential confound in previous experiments demonstrating LFG mediation of exemplar 
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abstract object recognition (Koutstaal et al., 2001; Simons et al., 2003). It is possible that 
top-down effects of task learning affect the activation of the LFG, as this region is 
proposed to be involved in a network of object recognition processes that recruits areas 
for processing visual and lexico-semantic information. 
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